By Fergus Llewelyn Turtle

The last few months have been nothing if not dramatic from Scottish nationalism. Rarely in politics do two figures as close as Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon once were fall out so fiercely or so publicly. Just when Sturgeon must have hoped that the saga was coming to an end, with an independent report clearing her of breaking the ministerial code, Salmond announced he was launching a new political party to fight the Scottish Parliament elections in May. Seemingly this spelled potential disaster for the SNP with a real risk of splitting the pro-independence vote. Salmond, however, claimed it would do no such thing and would instead help produce a ‘supermajority’ for independence which he says will be crucial in getting a second referendum on independence.

How could he credibly make such a claim and how accurate is it?

The answer lies in Scotland’s electoral system; the ‘Additional Member System’ or AMS. This system is a mix between first past the post (FPTP), where 73 districts each elect one person who gets the most votes, and a proportional list (PR) system, where parties are given ‘top-up’ seats to try match their percentage vote. This means that if a party wins lots of FPTP seats, like the SNP, it makes it less likely they will pick up extra seats on the list. On the other hand a party that finds it difficult to break through in individual FPTP seats, like the Scottish Greens, will get more seats from the list.

Crucially the Alba Party has announced they will only stand on the list, urging SNP voters to lend them their votes rather than ‘waste’ them. This idea of ‘gaming the electoral system‘ has been floated for some time in Scottish nationalist circles.

Is this strategy likely to be a success? Well it rather depends, not only on how much support Alba gets, but where that support comes from as they could well cost other pro-independence parties seats.

According to modelling analysis by Oxford University Doctoral candidate Leonardo Carella, if Alba were to take votes only from the SNP they would still need to get about 6% of the list vote before they produced a net negative to the total independence seats. Even then they could cause the SNP to fall short of an overall majority, which could make it harder to get a second independence referendum.

The situation could be even worse if we take into account the Scottish Greens, who also support independence and have long benefited from FPTP SNP voters switching to them on the list. If only 20% of Alba voters would have otherwise voted Green, Alba could need more than 11% before they start help rather than hinder the size of the pro-independence caucus.

Of course all of this could change if Alba can attract voters over from unionist parties They could also concentrate their vote in certain areas as the lists are divided into 8 regions. It does look like the party has a large mountain to climb, however. In the two opinion polls to come out since Alba’s launch the party only registered 3% and 6% support respectively on the list voting intention.

Furthermore Salmond’s personal approval ratings are low and he and Sturgeon’s falling out has cost the independence cause support. It’s very possible him being back on the front line of Scottish politics puts more voters off the idea of independence than it brings on board. It seems then a challenging task for Salmond’s new outfit to achieve what they set out to and become a genuine driving force to get Scottish independence across the line, albeit a challenge the former First Minister seems determined to rise to.

This is the third in a three-part series discussing the various models of periodisation of American electoral politics and their applicability to the contemporary United States’ political context. The first part can be read here and the second can be read here.

In this blog post we’ll consider how two models – the party system model and Leybovich’s model – can help us understand the modern US political context: What predictions do these models make about the future? Did their predictions about the recent past come true? And if so, does that mean they can be trusted looking forward?

Party system model

The significance of this model lies more in the start and end dates of each party system than the actual content of each. If the model holds water, the beginning of the 6th party system will directly influence whether we should expect any significant changes to be happening today. Party systems one, three and four (discarding the second as an outlier) each lasted an average of 36 years. If we assume the fifth party system (which started in 1930) was extended by ~10 years due to the Great Depression and FDR’s two extra terms (for a total of 46 years), then its end date is 1976, and the sixth party system started with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.

Therefore, 34-38 years after 1980 is some time around, well… now. Brewer and Maisel argue that the Democratic and Republican re-alignments following Trump’s 2016 victory may well constitute a seventh party system: how exciting! Short of a dramatic overhaul of the US electoral system, I’d be very surprised if we saw any real change from the way states have been voting in 2024 onwards; it’s been pretty consistent since the nineties – high levels of partisanship have shored up historical ‘lean’ states, with only ten or so casting the decisive electoral votes. But it’s not about the content of each party system; it’s about their timings.

It could be construed that Joe Biden’s victory has come at the same time as the start of a new party system. Is this consistent with other periods of history? Well… yes. New party systems tends to emerge as a result of political re-alignment. This re-alignment results in the rejection of one party (usually the one that dominated the previous party system) in favour of the other, just as we saw in 2020: the Republicans (who dominated the sixth party system) were rejected in favour of the Democrats.

Leybovich model

Leybovich’s model backs this up. Reagan was the transformer – he reshaped the GOP and spearheaded the modern conservative movement. His VP, George H. W. Bush, then took over and continued many of Reagan’s policies. Clinton was the triangulator – a more moderate Democrat in response to the conservative environment. George W. Bush was the reimaginer, Obama was the precursor, and Trump was the ender. Trump fits the role of ender well, offering an outdated impression of Reaganism. Biden, the incoming transformer then, should reshape the political environment. Will he be a great unifier? A transformational progressive? Will he finally tackle the climate crisis?

There’s been a sentiment for some years now that Democrats and Republicans are the same: they’re both fundamentally capitalist, statist, and only really differ on their limited definitions of freedom. This is how both parties can claim the same essential values, while still repeatedly squabbling. Although this concept is rather stale at this point in time, America stood before a great precipice in November 2020: the choice voters faced couldn’t have been more stark. The Democratic Party has become increasingly left-wing over recent years, while the Republican Party has gone “from a moderately conservative party to a very conservative party to something else entirely,” culminating in the storming of the United States’ Capitol building in January 2021.

Platitude aside, Joe Biden is to contend with the highest levels of polarisation within the American electorate since the days of the civil war. This has been especially true amongst Republicans – increasingly untrusting of their leaders, it’s no wonder a divisive, anti-establishment figure like Donald Trump has so successfully reshaped the GOP. So how is Joe Biden to bridge this divide and repair this fractured nation? Even before the Capitol Hill riots, it was claimed that deepening partisanship was threatening he stability of the US. Others have argued that racial divisions, climate change and the COVID crisis among a raft of other issues have broken the US. Biden’s first weeks as president may be previewing a much more progressive direction for the Democratic Party. And this might just be what the USA needs in order to be fixed.

Read the earlier blogs to understand more about the party system model and the Leybovich model.

This is the second in a three-part series of blogs discussing the various models of periodisation of American electoral politics and their applicability to the contemporary United States’ political context. The first part can be read here and the third can be read here.

Following on from the first blog in the series that looked at party systems, this blog considers presidential archetypes for a different perspective on the US political context. Research conducted by Misha Leybovich – what I will term the Leybovich model – both challenges and corroborates the party system model by considering the presidents themselves rather than the electoral science of their accessions.

According to the Leybovich model, the archetypes of presidents go through a cycle every 30 to 40 years, represented by a transformational leader at the start of each. As Leybovich notes, “[They] defined the political conversation for the next several decades.” This distinction is important, I feel; not only did these presidents transform politics in their own time, they also left a legacy that sustained their influence years after they left office. I’ve transcribed Leybovich’s spreadsheet and made a few tweaks for ease of understanding, but the idea is much the same.

The cycle is as follows:

• Transformer – brings a revolutionary new outlook to the political environment that will define the era.
• Continuer – the transformer’s sidekick, who carries on their legacy with similar ideas.
• Triangulator – a response from the opposing party to the re-alignment.
• Reimaginer – does what it says on the tin: they re-imagine the transformer’s original ideas.
• Precursor – can’t quite bring about any transformation change, but they do foreshadow the outlook of the next era.
• Ender – presents an expired impression of the transformer’s initial ideas, to lose re-election to another incoming transformer, beginning the cycle again.

This model actually backs up the regular political re-alignments that classify party systems – after all, there’s no rule that these patterns should occur so regularly – but like the party system model, it is important that Leybovich’s model is duly critiqued.

It should be noted that the two eras that fit the model best are the two most recent – what Leybovich terms the ‘collectivist’ and ‘individualist’ eras – begun by FDR and Reagan, respectively.

The first era, which he calls the ‘founding’ era, is definitely the messiest. James Madison – who, according to the model, would be a ‘reimaginer’ of Washington and Adams’ policies, was definitely more akin to those on either side of him – Jefferson and Monroe. The model would categorise Monroe as a precursor to Andrew Jackson. However, Monroe presided over a period of high bipartisanship – “the era of good feelings”. While Jackson, transformative as he was, was deeply divisive and is the root of the modern party divisions.

In comparison, the second era is sparse and brief, but this could be explained by the rising tensions that would lead to the civil war. Further, history shows that Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore were hardly precursors to Lincoln. However, the fact that separate study supports the existence of a brief second era further reinforces that the party system model also had a shorter second party system.

The third era sees Lincoln followed by four ‘continuer’ Presidents and Grover Cleveland supposedly fulfilling the roles of both Triangulator and Precursor – he definitely wasn’t the latter because he and Teddy Roosevelt didn’t agree on much.

The fourth, ‘progressive’ era is tricky because it happened at a time when both parties were re-aligning away from their 19th century platforms to their present ideologies. Woodrow Wilson didn’t ‘triangulate’ TR. This era also lacks a precursor to FDR. Even if Calvin Coolidge was substituted out of ‘Reimaginer’ and into this spot, it wouldn’t really fit.

Timings of Leybovich’s cycles roughly line up with party systems. But as described, the roles ascribed to the different presidents are far from perfect fits.

Personally, however, I find that application of the Leybovich Model provides a fascinating insight into the roles played by each president. By challenging the model we can question assumptions and understand some of the underlying trends and forces that have shaped US politics over the last 200+ years.

In the third and final part of this series, we’ll consider how these models influence our understanding of the context in which Joe Biden will operate as he settles into the role of President.

This was the second in a three-part series of blogs discussing the various models of periodisation of American electoral politics and their applicability to the contemporary United States’ political context. The first part can be read here and the third can be read here.

This is the first in a three-part series of blogs looking at various models of periodisation of American electoral politics and their applicability to the contemporary United States’ political context. The second part can be read here and the third can be read here.

In this blog we will look at the concept of a party system.  Of course party systems aren’t solely applicable to the US context. Party systems exist in many countries around the world, but having a handle on party systems provides a useful tool for studying how the country’s politics has evolved.

The most well-known definition of a party system is Sartori’s. He described it as: “The system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition.” But I find this tautological, doing little to help us ascertain the taxonomy/nomenclature of a party system. Others have gone further. Duverger, for example, argues that a party system is defined by the relationship between a number of characteristics of political parties: “Respective sizes, alliances, geographical localisation, political distribution and so on.” From this, it’s logical to infer that the issues of the day and party ideology are key parts of a party system – both factors which change over time. Therefore, party systems are a way of periodising US politics. Each system or period is characterised by distinct party ideologies, support for these parties, and the geographic concentration of that support. A party system can be thought of as a length of time as much as anything else: labels for electoral epochs.

For instance, the issues of slavery and reconstruction dominated US politics between the 1850s and the turn of the century, when the progressive movement began to take root. After 1900, the Republicans – who had once orchestrated an ambitious expansion of federal power – cemented themselves as the party of big business, while the Democrats – who had opposed those government reforms – slowly transitioned into the increasingly liberal party that implemented Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ policies in the 1930s. Both of these periods can be considered distinct party systems. Further, the fact that Southern states had been staunchly democratic prior to the Civil Rights Act, when they began becoming Republican bulwarks, can also help classify party systems.

The general consensus is that there have been six such systems since the republic’s founding in 1788 (e.g. Hershey). In the following maps – each denoting a party system – the strength of each colour represents the number of times the corresponding party won that state in Presidential elections between the dates shown.

The first party system is an obvious outlier. Here, lime green represents the Democratic-Republicans while orange represents the Federalists. These organisations were far more informal than the political parties we know today, and they (mostly the Democratic-Republicans) dominated politics for the first 36 years of the country’s history.

By 1828, the Federalist Party had collapsed and the Democratic-Republicans had divided into supporters of President Andrew Jackson, and his opponents. These would go on to become the Democrats (blue) and the Whigs (yellow), respectively, who presided over the second party system. By 1856, the issue of slavery had come to the fore. The Whigs were divided on the issue, and former supporters ultimately coalesced into the Republican Party (red). Though the Republicans contested this year’s election, their status as a political force was evident with the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860, truly cementing the existence of a new (the third) party system. Since then, the Democrats and Republicans have traded off control of the Presidency, but their respective ideologies and the geography of their support have also changed.

Although there is widespread academic acceptance of the party system model (e.g. Parties and Elections in America) it’s important that we don’t accept this blindly, and continue to challenge it. A significant inconsistency between party systems is their length. The first, third and fourth party systems each lasted between 34-38 years – approximately 8 or 9 presidential elections. The second, on the other hand, lasted 26 years – only 6 or 7 elections. This discrepancy can be attributed to the collapse of the Whigs and the issue of slavery, although it does point to flaws in the party system model.

There is also some ambiguity over when the fifth party system ended and the sixth party system began. Some have put this date at 1968, 1972, or the 1980s (when both parties’ contemporary identities first emerged). Still others have argued that it was as late as the 90s! If we assume the fifth party system was extended by ~10 years due to the Great Depression and FDR’s two extra terms, then this puts its end year at 1976 (where most academic suggestions average out), and so the start of the sixth party system, could be considered to be the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.

As shown, despite several flaws, the party system model has nonetheless proved broadly accurate for classifying different eras of US politics – each is distinct, in terms of active parties and the geography of their support. Furthermore, it could be argued that the brevity of one party system or ambiguity as to when a particular system started are not material criticisms in the first place. We are describing human events after all, and human activity rarely compartmentalises as neatly as we might like. Overall, due to the general academic acceptance of the model and that the minor flaws that can be explained away I believe that the model is useful and applicable to the modern US political context.

This was the first in a three-part series of blogs looking at various models of periodisation of American electoral politics and their applicability to the contemporary United States’ political context. The second part can be read here and the third can be read here.

The Chilean protests of 2020 resulted in the death of 36 people, with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reporting 28,000 people were jailed during the events. Chile, one of South America’s most stable nations in the post-Cold War period, has been relatively free of coups since the 17-year rule of General Augusto Pinochet; whose rule left more than 3,000 people dead and missing. 

This said, the casualties suffered by the social movement have been the worst since the dictatorship. Furthermore, the protests within the last year have seen the rising involvement of the militarised police system inside Chile. Whilst the tactics under Piñera’s government were not the same under Pinochet’s – this rise in violence is worrying for Chile.

The social unrest began back in October 2019, within Chile’s capital city Santiago. What would start as minimal protests surrounding an increase in subway fares, eventually spiralled into an eruption of violence. Piñera’s authorisation of deploying the national police force (the Carabineros de Chile) would mark the start of aggressive clashes between protestors and the Carabineros for several months.

The clashes prompted human rights organisations to allege serious human rights violations. Five human rights reports – authorised by Amnesty International, amongst others – denounced the brutal and discriminative violence of the militarised police. Amnesty International has received hundreds of complaints about serious human rights violations that range from excessive use of force to torture, illegal raids and arbitrary detention. Chile’s National Institute for Human Rights received similar allegations, as well as reports of sexual violence. Exact figures are hard to come by. However, it is reported that there were 194 sexual violence violations in the first two months. 

The number of protestors who suffered eye mutilations as a result of state violence has received much attention. The Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos (INDH) places the figure upwards of 427 people. The Chilean Ophthalmology Society state this is the highest number of injuries of this type registered during protests in the world. The injuries were the result of indiscriminative use of riot guns, with Carabineros officers often aiming at demonstrators’ heads.  

The scrutiny directed towards the Carabineros raises questions about their place in today’s society and the decision not to dismantle them after Pinochet’s rule ended in 1990. Since 2017, high-ranking police officers have been investigated for malfeasance, reducing public trust in the Carabineros, which plummeted from 65% in 2009 to 17% at the end of 2019 (CEP surveys). Meanwhile, more than 35 generals who were part of the Carabineros forces have been ousted in the wake of a series of scandals.  

Furthermore, the Carabineros, were never significantly reformed after Pinochet’s rule ended in 1990 and as previously stated are still a very prominent force within society today. It is this connection between past and present that provides an explanation of the continuities and parallels with dictatorship-era repression. It helps highlights that the climate for repression to occur is not fixed and can be carried out in two very different political contexts; both in a military junta as well as a democratically elected government.  

Chile has witnessed its worst civil unrest since the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship. Carabineros’ ever-growing presence within Chilean Society, as well as their increased violence, has now been made visible on the world stage. Their use of aggression violating human rights highlights striking comparisons to the dictatorship of Pinochet and the Cold War period. 

In wake of their continued aggression, somewhat 30 years after the end of Pinochet’s rule, it is clear change needs to come. Whether that be in the form of constitutional amendments, with the current framework allowing the excessive use of force, change in core government tactics in response to protestors or a switch in government. Until then, the legacy of Pinochet and the Cold War will live on today in Chile’s society.   

How long must we wait? Is the end near? Or is history repeating itself?

This investigative episode explores the livelihoods of black and ethnic minority communities in the UK and aims to find out whether racial tensions in Britain are still present. We explore how much has changed for two generations of black and ethnic minority people in Great Britain and discover how racial disparity has shaped the livelihoods and identities of black and ethnic minorities.

In light of the killing of George Floyd, an American father and husband, who was brutally murdered in the hands of the police, sparked tensions across the world.

It is not the first time such events have taken place where the killings and mistreatment of young black men and women fatally lose their lives due to the colour of their skin. But the killing of Floyd was the first time in global history where racism sparked uproar across the world. In fact, the significance of this crime was so volatile, that it diverted attention to racial disparity within Britain. In the midst of a global lockdown due to the coronavirus pandemic, social media platforms were pervaded with racial injustice, extrajudicial video footage of black men and women being murdered by state authority and a social justice movement named as #BLACKOUTTUESDAY which incentivised every social media user to only post a black square to represent solidarity. Being restricted from leaving the comfort of your own home, hundreds of thousands abandoned the government guidelines to march in solidarity across many different cities in the UK. Why? Every race, ethnicity, and diaspora were, as Yaw Owusu put It in our episode, “given a level of strength and new energy for black people, who were saying, you know what… I am sick of this”. Many wanted to ascertain whether racial tensions in Britain were still present and why those who have died in the hands of the police or experienced racial discrimination were not held accountable. The ever-present line from Al Sharpton saying “Get your knee off our necks” immersed around the global atmosphere. Its significance was more than police brutality, but metaphorically envisaged centuries of pain, prejudice, and persecution. How much has really changed in the relationship between black and ethnic minorities and the state? Is the UK still racist and if so, how has this tailored people in society, their livelihoods, their jobs, and their identity? The UK is certainly not innocent for its crimes regarding racial discrimination, unlawful incarceration, and excessive use of force against ethnic minorities.

So, our investigation begins at marking the 40^th anniversary of the 1981 inner-city riots in England which sparked form racial tensions between black and ethnic minorities and the police. The weak relationship between the police and ethnic minority communities since the early 30s, illustrated how black and ethnic minorities were susceptible to racial prejudice, the ‘stop and search’ law and many other draconian measures. We speak to Phil O’Brien, an 18 year old photographer at the time of the riots in Toxteth, recalls it as a “Baptism of Fire” which continues to burn today.

The big two major riots that took place within Brixton and Toxteth, highlighted that the millennial of the 80’s were prepared to stand up against the sectarian acts of the police. The Macpherson report, published after the death of the black teenager Stephan Lawrence, criticised the implementation of ‘stop and search’. The report exposed the Metropolitan Police of “institutional racism” and stressed the excessive use of force and incidence of stops and searches were evidently a clear case of racist stereotyping. As of today, the Metropolitan Police invidious behaviour towards ethnic minorities in the UK was certainly not overlooked by the BLM protestors. Chants of “Mark Duggan”, “SARAH REED”, “Dalian Atkinson” and hundreds of black and ethnic minority lives who were taken away by police officers in the UK, cloaked the atmosphere. The picture has not changed from 40 years ago but mirrors the same bigotry towards ethnic minorities. Statistics show between 2009/10 and 2018/19, for White people the stop and search rate were lower than the national rate every year, whereas in contrast, the rates for Black, Asian and Mixed ethnic groups were higher than the national rate every year. Black African, Black Caribbean and Other Black groups consistently had the highest rates.

Interviewing Leroy Logan, ex superintendent in the Metropolitan Police and MBE, he labels such behaviour is part of the “institutional racism” that continues to pervade the UK police force.  The racial stereotyping that is carried out by officers, is perfectly executed in Steve McQueen’s Small Axe series which illustrates Leroy’s very own life as a black officer working under a discriminatory institution after his father was assaulted by two police officers. The life of Leroy who is acted by John Boyega, demonstrates the black British experience and the battle of advocating better relationships between the police and minority ethnic communities in Britain. He explains to us that although there has been some improvement by the implementation of more officers being recruited from diverse backgrounds and the creation of his charity Voyage that aims to inspire the young black millennial, even to this day “policing attitudes are going backwards”. There is more room for improvement within the police force for not only incorporating diversity but understanding the importance of it. He hopes the Small Axe series “inspires” everyone to realise the institutional racism that takes place within the police force and that is part of public and private institutions.

Speaking of public and private institutions, the picture is much bigger than the draconian stop and search enforcements. Institutional racism takes places in many different shapes and forms, a tall block of flats to be exact. On the night of June 2017, the Grenfell Tower situated in one of the wealthiest boroughs in London – Kensington and Chelsea, replicated the inferno of hell. With cladding material on the tower further escalating the fire to spread, 72 residents died in the blaze with no possibility of escaping. Understandably, the tragic event has put the matter of social housing at the forefront of public and government matters. However, with many Grenfell residents being from ethnic minority backgrounds, the question turned to whether the poor response, accountability and slow process by government, councillors, and the construction industry, was racially and socioeconomically motivated. Speaking to Yvette Williams, founder of Justice4Grenfell and witnessing the fire from her living room window, says she heard “a loud bang, screaming and residents shouting for help from their windows”. She also says that as the fire burned for 60 hours, it foreshadowed how slow the response from the government and councillors would be. The Grenfell Tower fire highlights two key important terms, class, and race. The question will always remain whether if residents within the building were a different race and social class, would the matter at hand have been handled much better? Most importantly, accountability is crucial, and it appeared that every political party was responsible for not standing in solidarity to the institutional racism that was evident in this event. Yvette being a proud Labour party member believes they have “failed” in representing what the party embodies – the representation of the working-class and diverse communities. She urges that they must “shut up and listen for once.”, to “listen to cries of the working-class communities” and ethnic minorities in Britain who are consistently neglected.

This episode does not just revisit past events, but what is happening at this very moment. Coronavirus. We investigate the livelihoods of ethnic minority communities amongst the pandemic. Does institutional, structural, and systemic racism give reason to the disproportionate rates of infections and deaths of black and ethnic minority communities? The structural racism within the UK has had a greater impact on ethnic minorities, James Nazroo a sociology lecturer at the University of Manchester explains the reason behind the disproportionality. Nazroo explains that “these communities are at a greater risk because the way racism permeates our societies”, the disproportion operates in a number of ways, “it relates to the types of jobs and the geography of where they live”, which clearly shows the marked inequalities that separates minority ethnic communities from the wider society. Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Matt Hancock Secretary State for Health and Social Care are aware of the significant risks these communities face, the majority of key workers being from these communities worked on the frontline in the pandemic in many risk-driven jobs. ONS data reports mortality rates for COVID-19 deaths at the start of the pandemic from the period 2^nd March – 15^th May 2020 was highest for males of Black ethnic background at 255.7 deaths per 100,000 population and low among White males at 87.0 per 100,000. Similarly, high rates for women of Black ethnic backgrounds were at 119.8 per 100,000 whereas women of White ethnic background were 52.0. The disparity in mortality rates is staggering, Nazroo believes the solution to tackle this is for public and private institutions to recognise the discrimination towards minority ethnic communities in the workplace, applying for jobs, geographical location, and the effects of gentrification. The impact of these inequalities is a catalyst for COVID-19 deaths among black and ethnic minorities.

This short documentary has brought awareness to the institutional racism that British public and private institutions exert. The very same issues 40 years ago regarding racial tensions in the UK, continues to permeate our society today. The racial injustice towards black and ethnic minority communities must be put to an end. No more inquiries. No more reports. It is time to hold accountability to the many elites that have gotten away with extrajudicial crimes. Racism in the UK remains as contentious as it was 40 years ago and even more. If these matters are not attended to then this question will remain at the forefront of discrimination in this country… As David Lammy puts “When? When? Just when will Black Lives Matter again?”

If you would like to find out more about the topics discussed in this episode visit:

• Paul O’brien Report from May 31, 2020 on the Black Lives Matter protests in NY – https://w42st.com/post/unlawful-assembly-blacklivesmatter-hells-kitchen-times-square/

• Nazroo, J. and Bécares, L. (2020) ‘Racism is the key to understanding ethnic inequalities in COVID-19 – despite what UK government says’, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/racism-is-the-key-to-understanding-ethnic-inequalities-in-covid-19-despite-what-uk-government-says-148838

• Say their names – https://www.vice.com/en/article/qj4j8x/remembering-police-brutality-victims-uk